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North Carolina Abandons the Mutuality Requirement
for Defensive Collateral Estoppel
The law of collateral estoppel in North Carolina has been in disarray for the
past thirty years.1 The North Carolina Supreme Court's 1986 decision in
Thomas M. McInnis & Associates., Inc. v. Hall2 has done much to clarify things,
because it states unequivocally for the first time that North Carolina no longer
requires a party defensively asserting collateral estoppel to have been a party or
a privy to the prior action. In doing away with the mutuality requirement, the
decision aligns North Carolina with the majority ofjurisdictions in the country.3
But the case raises as many questions as it answers-questions about the funda-
mental nature of collateral estoppel-and these portend a new round of
litigation.
This Note will sketch the development of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
in North Carolina and in other jurisdictions to show both the historical and
conceptual background of McInnis. It will then discuss how McInnis changes
North Carolina law, arguing that although the decision clarifies the black-letter
law of mutuality, the facts of the case provide an inappropriate vehicle for such
clarification. As a result, the decision in McInnis threatens to allow defendants
to assert collateral estoppel defensively in situations in which the plaintiff has
had little or no opportunity to litigate the issue in an earlier action.
McInnis began as an action for breach of contract between plaintiff,
Thomas M. McInnis & Associates (McInnis), and Janet and Bobby Hall. The
Halls hired McInnis to sell their poultry farm at auction, and Mclnnis was to
earn a commission based on the sale price.4 McInnis conducted the auction and
collected a deposit of $9,750 from the highest bidder for the farm. Because of a
dispute between the Halls and the bidder, the sale never closed. In the meantime
Mclnnis retained the deposit it had collected from the bidder at the auction. In
December 1980, Bobby Hall filed a lawsuit against McInnis for the amount of
the deposit. McInnis counterclaimed against Bobby Hall alone for damages to-
talling $7,800 for breach of the auction contract.5 Because it had performed its
part of the contract by conducting the auction, McInnis demanded its
commission.
At a jury trial, McInnis won on the counterclaim. After the verdict was
returned, McInnis requested that the judge award damages based on the amount
determined from the contract plus interest calculated from the date of the sale.
1. Note, Civil Procedure-Offensive Assertion of a Prior Judgment as Collateral Estoppel-A
Sword in the Hands of the Plaintiff?, 52 N.C.L. REV. 836, 836 (1974); Note, Civil Procedure-
Broadening the Use of Collateral Estoppel-The Requirement of Mutuality of Parties, 47 N.C.L.
REV. 690, 691-92 (1969).
2. 318 N.C. 421, 349 S.E.2d 552 (1986).
3. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4464
(1981).
4. Mclnnis, 318 N.C. at 423, 349 S.E.2d at 553.
5. Id. The action against Bobby Hall was in Richmond Co. Dist. Ct., No. 83CVD281.
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The judge refused this request, ruling that the issue was properly one for the
jury.6 Because McInnis had not requested a jury instruction on the issue, it
waived any rights to the interest. The judge therefore awarded a judgment in-
cluding interest accruing from the date of the judgment rather than the date of
the sale.7
Shortly before Bobby Hall paid the judgment in the case, McInnis insti-
tuted an action against Janet Hall (Hall) to recover the prejudgment interest the
judge had denied in the first action. Hall assumed that McInnis was attempting
to collect the judgment from the first action, and when her husband informed
her that he had just paid the judgment, she ignored the summons. Since she
failed to respond, the court awarded McInnis a default judgment in July 1983.8
Hall then moved to set aside the default judgment. This motion required her to
show that her failure to answer the complaint constituted "excusable neglect,"
and also that she had "a meritorious defense." 9 The trial court denied Hall's
motion, finding that although her failure to answer was excusable, she did not
have a meritorious defense.10 The court of appeals affirmed."
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the lower
courts that Hall's neglect was excusable,12 but holding, contrary to the lower
courts, that she had a meritorious defense of collateral estoppel. 13 The court
began its analysis of Hall's position by noting three requirements for collateral
estoppel:
For Mrs. Hall to assert a plea of collateral estoppel under North Caro-
lina law as traditionally applied, she would need to show that the ear-
lier suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits, that the issue in
question was identical to an issue actually litigated and necessary to
the judgment, and that both she and McInnis were either parties to the
earlier suit or were in privity with parties.14
The court proceeded to analyze Hall's argument, concluding that she met the
first two requirements, but not the last.
Concerning the first requirement, the court was succinct: "The prior suit
resulted in a judgment on the merits."' 15 The second requirement elicited a more
detailed analysis. The court noted that the issue of prejudgment interest was
identical to that raised by McInnis after the verdict in the first action. Further,
McInnis had "actually litigated" the issue in the first action by including in the
6. McInnis, 318 N.C. at 423, 349 S.E.2d at 553.
7. Id. at 423, 349 S.E.2d at 553-54.
8. Id. at 423-24, 349 S.E.2d at 554.
9. Id. at 424, 349 S.E.2d at 554. "Excusable neglect" includes, the court said, "what, under
all the surrounding circumstances, may be reasonably expected of a party in paying proper attention
to his case." Id. at 425, 349 S.E.2d at 555.
10. Id. at 424, 349 S.E.2d at 554.
11. Thomas M. Mclnnis & Assocs. v. Hall, 76 N.C. App. 486, 489-90, 333 S.E.2d 544, 546-47(1985).
12. Mclnnis, 318 N.C at 424-26, 349 S.E.2d at 555. This Note will not discuss the court's
analysis of the issue of excusable neglect.
13. Id. at 435, 349 S.E.2d at 560.




original pleading a request for interest calculated from the date of sale and argu-
ing the issue to the judge.16 Not only had McInnis litigated the issue, the court
concluded, it had been "actually determined" when the judge declined to grant
the interest as requested.' 7 The judge's determination was "necessary to the
resulting judgment," because the award would have been different if the judge
had allowed recovery of the interest.
Although Hall met the first two requirements for collateral estoppel, she
did not meet the requirement of privity. 18 But after making that determination,
the supreme court reviewed the "modem trend" toward abandonment of the
requirement.19 After reviewing most of the cases, the opinion concluded, "We
are presented in the instant case with a proposed defensive use of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, and we see no good reason for continuing to require mutual-
ity of estoppel in cases like this case."'20 With this conclusion, the mutuality
requirement made its exit from the North Carolina law of defensive collateral
estoppel, and in its place came the much less demanding requirement that the
other party have had "a full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue in the
prior action.2 1
The discussion of collateral estoppel must begin with the companion doc-
trine of res judicata, 22 which provides that a party has only one chance to liti-
gate, through trial and appeal, a cause of action against a defendant. 23 If the
plaintiff wins, his cause of action is said to be "merged" in the judgment. If he
loses, any further attempt to prosecute the cause of action is "barred." 24 Collat-
eral estoppel is a defense that invokes a "bar" like that in res judicata, but the
bar derives from the adjudication of a particular issue in a prior action. The
Second Restatement of Judgments defines collateral estoppel in this way:
"When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determi-
nation is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the
16. Id. at 430, 349 S.E.2d at 557.
17. Id.
18. It is worth noting that when the supreme court first sketched out the requirements, it stated
the third requirement in terms of parties and privities. Then, when it discussed the facts of the case,
the court spoke entirely in terms of mutuality, as if the two terms were interchangeable. McInnis,
318 N.C. at 429, 432, 349 S.E.2d at 557, 558.
19. Mclnnis, 318 N.C. at 432, 349 S.E.2d at 559.
20. Id. at 434, 349 S.E.2d at 560. The court's procedure in reaching this decision is reminiscent
of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See infra note 39. As
in the United States Supreme Court case, the parties did not request that the court overturn the
mutuality requirement. Hall had argued that she was in privity with her husband, so the mutuality
requirement was met. The court justified its ruling under these circumstances by pointing to a pas-
sage in Hall's brief "requesting in essence that this Court adopt an expansive application of collateral
estoppel." McInnis, 318 N.C. at 435, 349 S.E.2d at 560.
21. Id.
22. McInnis, 318 N.C. at 427, 349 S.E.2d at 556; see also Note, The Impacts of Defensive and
Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1012-14
(1967) (exploring the conceptual relationships between res judicata and collateral estoppel).
23. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 810, 122 P.2d 892,
894 (1942).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 19 (1980).
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same or a different claim."'25
The language in the Second Restatement that a determination in a prior
action is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties is a recognition
that the assertion of collateral estoppel against a nonparty "would deprive the
nonparty of his day in court, a violation of due process."'26 An exception has
developed, however, for an individual who was a privy to the party in the prior
action. A nonparty may be considered in privity with a party if she is a succes-
sor in interest to property that was the subject of the prior litigation, if her inter-
ests were represented by the party, or if she controlled the prior action despite
the fact she was not a party.27 Because of this connection to the prior action, the
privy party's interests were represented. Her due process rights are protected
even if she is estopped from subsequently litigating, as a party, an issue deter-
mined in the action to which she was not a party.28
Closely related to the privity requirement is the requirement of mutuality.
The mutuality principle states that a party cannot assert collateral estoppel un-
less the earlier judgment could have been used against him had the outcome
been different. The earlier action must have been equally binding on both par-
ties to the subsequent action.29 The relation between the mutuality and privity
requirements is such that a strict interpretation of privity is in effect a require-
ment of mutuality. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has recognized this
connection, 30 and the North Carolina Supreme Court has enforced mutuality
effectively through the privity requirement. 31 In McInnis the court substituted
the terminology of mutuality for that of privity without so much as a
comment.
32
The requirement of mutuality was for many years a largely unexamined
principle.33 In 1942, however, Justice Roger J. Traynor authored a California
25. Id. § 27. The Restatement prefers the terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" to
res judicata and collateral estoppel. The North Carolina Supreme Court took note of this termino-
logical preference but continued to rely on the traditional labels. McInnis, 318 N.C. at 428 n.l, 349
S.E.2d at 556 n.1.
26. Note, supra note 22, at 1014. "Parties" in the prior action need not have been plaintiff and
defendant. A judgment on a crossclaim is res judicata for a subsequent action by one party to the
crossclaim against the other. Stansel v. McIntyre, 237 N.C. 148, 154, 74 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1953).
27. Note, supra note 22, at 1014. The application of the privity exception is not always as
broad as these general rules might suggest. See, e.g., Rabil v. Farris, 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321
(1938) (privity limited to succession in interest to property rights).
28. The principle is embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's provisions for class
actions, Rule 23(b)(3). If a member of the class fails to opt out of the action, he is bound by its
outcome.
29. Queen City Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 435, 85 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1955). The mutu-
ality and privity requirements are so closely related as to be almost indistinguishable. Professor
Semmel indicated as much in his suggestion that the expansion of the concept of privity has "cor-
roded" the mutuality rule. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 1457, 1458 (1968).
30. Girard Trust Bank v. Belk, 41 N.C. App. 328, 342, 255 S.E.2d 430, 439, cert. denied, 298
N.C. 293, 259 S.E.2d 299 (1979).
31. National Mortgage Corp. v. American Title Ins. Co., 299 N.C. 369, 261 S.E.2d 844 (1980),
32. Mclnnis, 318 N.C. at 329, 332, 349 S.E.2d at 557, 558.
33. The United States Supreme Court, for example, could say in 1911, "It is a principle of
general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual." Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1911). The principle was indeed so elementary
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Supreme Court decision, Bernhard v. Bank ofAmerica National Trust & Savings
Assoc.,34 rejecting mutuality in unmistakable terms. In this case, plaintiff sought
to recover money withdrawn from defendant bank by the executor of plaintiff's
decedent. In an earlier action against the executor plaintiff along with other par-
ties, attempted to establish that the money belonged to the estate. The court
ruled that the money had been given to the executor as a gift. In the subsequent
action against the bank, the bank argued that the issue of ownership of the
money had been litigated by plaintiff in the earlier action against the executor
and that plaintiff therefore should be estopped from relitigating the issue against
the bank. The mutuality requirement would have precluded the bank from
making this argument because the bank was neither a party nor privy to the
earlier action. Justice Traynor disposed of this objection summarily: "No satis-
factory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just
why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from
asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to
comprehend. ' '35
Although Justice Traynor repudiated the mutuality requirement, he did not
leave a vacuum in its place. He said that three questions would be "pertinent":
Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication?36
If the circumstances satisfy these criteria, a defendant may plead collateral es-
toppel without infringing on the due process rights of the plaintiff, even in the
absence of mutuality.
Bernhard did not have a strong immediate effect. 37 Not until 1971 did the
United States Supreme Court adopt its position in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.38 Plaintiff earlier had brought a patent
infringement action and ended up not only losing, but having its own patent
declared invalid. In Blonder-Tongue the Court held defendant, who was not a
party to the earlier action, to have a valid defense of collateral estoppel.39 The
that Justice Lurton deemed further comment unnecessary. Even though the principle had been
unexamined by the courts, it had been under attack for over a century, most notably by Jeremy
Bentham, in a passage more recent courts are fond of quoting. Mutuality was, he wrote, "a maxim
which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench." J. BENTHAM,
Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowing ed. 1843). Ben-
tham is quoted not only in Mclnnis, 318 N.C. at 432-33, 349 S.E.2d at 559, but by the United States
Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 322-
23 (1971). The mutuality requirement has not, however, been without its defenders. See, e.g., Moore
& Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv. 301 (1961); Semmel, supra
note 29.
34. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
35. Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
36. Id.
37. See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 27 (1965).
38. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
39. Id. at 350. Defendant did not in fact litigate the issue of collateral estoppel or even raise the
issue on appeal. The Court went to great lengths to encourage the parties to argue the issue, but
neither party would press for abandonment of the mutuality requirement. Since the Court could not
1988]
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Court's opinion explored the mutuality requirement only with respect to patent
cases and indicated that its holding was meant to apply to patent cases alone,40
but the case soon came to stand for a broad rejection of mutuality for defensive
collateral estoppel.4 1 The federal courts now unequivocally reject the mutuality
requirement, and "a continually increasing majority of state courts" are doing
the same.4 2 A student commentator has predicted that "the requirement inevi-
tably will become the 'dead letter' that one court already has labelled it."'43
The abrogation of the mutuality requirement has forced courts to determine
whether a plaintiff has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue. Such a
determination provides "a most significant safeguard," in the words of the
Blonder-Tongue Court, of the fairness of applying nonmutual estoppel."
Blonder-Tongue indicates several relevant factors,45 and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has organized them into a five-part test.4 6
The elements of the test are (1) who chose the forum,4 7 (2) whether the party
against whom the estoppel is asserted had an incentive to litigate vigorously in
the prior action,4 8 (3) whether the subject matter of the prior case was so arcane
and difficult that the court failed to understand it,49 (4) whether the party "was
deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the prior case," 50 and (5) whether
"the trial court's sense of justice and equity" is satisfied.5 1
Since Blonder-Tongue the Supreme Court has gone further and cautiously
relaxed the mutuality requirement for offensive uses of collateral estoppel. In
address the mutuality issue if it had not been raised by the parties, it finally inveigled the counsel for
Blonder-Tongue at oral argument to agree it might have reason to reconsider the mutuality require-
ment "in a case such as this." Id. at 319. This was enough for the Court, and it considered that it
had been asked by counsel to address the issue. Id. at 319-20.
40. Id. at 327.
41. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 3, at § 4464.
42. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 3, at § 4464. Not everyone, however,
agrees on the state of the scorecard. In 1980 commentators said "(s~ome doubt remains as to
whether the [Bernhard] rationale is accepted in a majority of states. There is no question, however,
that a substantial minority still clings to the mutuality requirement." Callen & Kadue, To Bury
Mutuality, Not to Praise It: An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 755, 757 (1980).
43. Note, Collateral Estoppel Without Mutuality: Accepting the Bernhard Doctrine, 35 VAND. L.
REv. 1423, 1424 (1982) (quoting B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195,
198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967)).
44. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329.
45. Id. at 333-34.
46. Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 992-95 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980). Miller Brewing involved a claim by Miller that Schlitz was
infringing its rights to the trademark, LITE. After initiating the action, Miller sought a preliminary
injunction against Heileman Brewing Company for the same alleged infringement. When the court
refused to allow the injunction against Heileman, holding that Miller could not claim trademark
rights to the word "light" based on its LITE trademark, Schlitz asserted the judgment in estoppel
against Miller. Under the circumstances, it was clear that Miller had controlled the litigation and
had had a full opportunity to present its case. Thus, the court's sense ofjustice and equity was easily
satisfied.
47. Id. at 992-93.
48. Id. at 993.
49. Id. at 993-94.
50. Id. at 994-95.
51. Id. at 995 (quoting Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 334).
[Vol. 66
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the leading case, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,52 the Court allowed plaintiff in a
shareholder derivative suit to estop defendant from relitigating an issue that had
been decided against it in an earlier action brought by the Securities Exchange
Commission. The offensive use of collateral estoppel by a party who was not
involved in an earlier action has troubling implications,5 3 and the Court has
carefully hedged the circumstances in which parties may invoke the tactic.54
In North Carolina the state of the law of collateral estoppel has been un-
clear because of a combination of contradictory holdings by the supreme court.
The prevailing approach has been to require mutuality, and the court's rhetoric
has consistently affirmed the mutuality requirement. But a small handful of de-
cisions forecasts the court's developing inclination to abandon mutuality, and if
these holdings can constitute a "tradition" of some sort, it never has been recon-
ciled with the dominant line of decisions.
The North Carolina Supreme Court long ago adopted the mutuality re-
quirement for collateral estoppel. 55 The court has in fact applied the principle
with remarkable rigor. In Rabil v. Farris5 6 a father brought an action as next
friend for personal injuries to his daughter arising out of an auto accident. He
failed to establish defendant's negligence in the first action, but proceeded to file
another action on his own behalf for medical expenses and loss of his daughter's
services. Because the issues of negligence were the same in both actions, defend-
ant attempted to raise a collateral estoppel defense. He succeeded at the trial
level, but the supreme court held that the father had been neither a party57 nor
privy in the first action because he had no relation to the property rights at issue
there. No privity to the earlier action meant no mutuality, so the court held that
collateral estoppel was unavailable.5 8
Despite the court's sometimes rigid adherence to the mutuality require-
ment, the cases recognize two limited exceptions. The first is mechanical: if an
individual controls the litigation in a prior case, she can be considered bound by
the outcome of that case for purposes of mutuality even if she was not techni-
cally a party or privy. 59 The second exception is based on status: if a plaintiff
fails to establish a claim against an employee, the judgment in that action will
bar a subsequent action against the employer, assuming that the action against
52. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
53. In Parklane Hosiery an additional complication was that the estoppel worked to deny de-
fendant a jury trial to which he would have been entitled had the second case been tried first. Id. at
333-37.
54. "[I]n cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where.., the
application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the
use of offensive collateral estoppel." Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331.
55. Queen City Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 85 S.E.2d 688 (1955); Rabil v. Farris, 213
N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938); Leroy v. Pasquotank & N. River Steamboat Co., 165 N.C. 109, 80
S.E. 984 (1914).
56. 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938).
57. Id. at 415-16, 196 S.E. at 322 (since he acted as next friend to his daughter).
58. Id. at 416, 196 S.E. at 322. Justice Barnhill dissented from the court's narrow conception of
privity. Id. at 417-19, 196 S.E. at 322-24 (Barnhill, J., dissenting).
59. Smoky Mountain Enters., Inc. v. Rose, 283 N.C. 373, 377-78, 196 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1973).
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the employer is founded on the doctrine of respondeat superior.6°
Even as the court was imposing the mutuality requirement 6' and recogniz-
ing two narrow exceptions, 62 it handed down two decisions that, standing by
themselves, could be interpreted as a wholesale rejection of mutuality. The most
important for the law of defensive collateral estoppel is Crosland-Cullen Co. v.
Crosland,63 an action by an employer to recover an insurance payment made to
the wife of the deceased. In an earlier action, the employer made a claim for
payment against the insurance company and argued that an assignment of the
policy by the deceased to his wife was invalid. The employer lost the first action,
but then sued the wife, hoping to relitigate the validity of the assignment. The
supreme court went through the formality of reasserting North Carolina's ad-
herence to the mutuality requirement, but added that "[these] rules are subject
to exception." 64 The Crosland-Cullen exception, the court wrote, was based on
"public policy," 65 and the court cited Bernhard in support of its holding. What
is remarkable about Crosland-Cullen is that any public policy explanation for
the holding is almost necessarily a rationale for abandoning mutuality alto-
gether, and the citation of Bernhard reinforces this impression. There is nothing
special about the relation between the wife of the deceased and the insurance
company that would justify merely a limited exception to the mutuality
requirement. 6 6
60. Taylor v. Denton Hatchery, Inc., 251 N.C. 689, 691, 111 S.E.2d 864, 865-66 (1960). The
court noted two possible policy explanations for this special rule. The rule might be explained by an
assumption that the employer and employee are in privity. Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock
Land Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 506, 2 S.E.2d 570, 573 (1939). But the court found "other authorities...
[who] hold that in such cases the technical rule is, upon grounds of public policy, expanded so as to
embrace within the estoppel of a judgment persons Who are not, strictly speaking, either parties or
privies." Id. In Taylor the court held that the proper explanation for the rule is the latter, an
abrogation of mutuality, rather than the expansion of privity. Taylor, 251 N.C. at 692, 111 S.E.2d at
866. This small distinction in policy explanations is worth noting because it shows that the court
was capable of contemplating public policy reasons for abandoning mutuality--even if the public
policy aims were not articulated-at the very time it was insisting, without any discussion, that
mutuality was the law.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
63. 249 N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 655 (1958).
64. Id. at 169-70, 105 S.E.2d at 656 (quoting Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C. 679, 691, 79 S.E.2d 167, 175 (1953)).
65. Id. at 170, 105 S.E.2d at 657.
66. See Note, Civil Procedure-Broadening the Use of Collateral Estoppel-The Requirement of
Mutuality of Parties, 47 N.C.L. REv. 690, 695-96 (1969) ("Crosland is virtually the same case as
Bernhard .... ").
Fifteen years later the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the "exception" established in
Crosland-Cullen, and again the holding was an effective abandonment of the mutuality requirement
even though the court's rhetoric indicated differently. In Gillispie v. Thomasville Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 17 N.C. App. 545, 195 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 393, 196 S.E.2d 275 (1973),
plaintiff first sued a grocer for injuries sustained as a result of a soda bottle explosion. After the
grocer won a jury verdict, plaintiff brought suit against the bottling company, alleging breach of
warranty. The court allowed the bottling company to plead collateral estoppel, because the issues in
the two cases were identical. Id. at 549, 195 S.E.2d at 48. The court could have allowed the collat-
eral estoppel claim under another theory. The defendant grocer in the first case had impleaded the
bottling company and filed a cross-claim for indemnification. Id. at 546, 195 S.E.2d at 46. As a
result, the bottler could have been understood to be a privy to the first action and therefore entitled
to assert collateral estoppel. But instead the court chose to ground its holding on the Crosland-
Cullen "exception" to the mutuality requirement. What moved the court was not the relation be-
(Vol. 66
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The second supreme court case that seemingly overturned mutuality was
the most radical, arguably negating the requirement when collateral estoppel is
asserted offensively. King v. Grindstaff67 was a wrongful death action brought
by the administrator of the estates of a husband and wife killed in an automobile
accident. Plaintiff argued that defendant should be estopped from defending the
issue of his negligence, since he had lost on that issue in an earlier case brought
by the daughters of the deceased for their permanent injuries, pain and suffering,
and medical expenses.68 The court decided that, although the administrator
brought the action in the second case, the parties in the two cases were identical
because the daughters would be the beneficiaries of the administrator's action. 69
A student commentator has argued that the King court's holding that the
beneficiaries were the real parties in interest was wrong, and that in fact the
identity of parties requirement was not met.70 The author noted, "because the
requirement of the traditional identity of parties rule was not met, it appears
that King created another ad hoc exception to the mutuality-identity rule by
allowing a non-party to the prior action to assert the prior action offensively as
collateral estoppel. ' '7 1 This proposition is certainly debatable, because the case
could be understood to say more about the law of real parties in interest than
about mutuality. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the court went to great
lengths to find an argument for identity of parties because of its appreciation for
the policy concerns that prompted the decisions in Crosland-Cullen, Blonder-
Tongue, Parklane Hosiery, Bernhard, and now, McInnis.
The McInnis holding not only brings North Carolina law into line with the
federal courts and the majority of state courts, but clarifies the black-letter law
in this state regarding the requirement of mutuality as well. Litigants examining
prior decisions faced a consistent rhetoric paying homage to the mutuality re-
quirement, but also a series of holdings hinting that mutuality could be passed
over in circumstances left largely undefined. But Mclnnis has further implica-
tions not so quickly appreciated. First, it reaffirms an established tradition that
a judgment of a court will have estoppel effect even if it is in error. Second, it
establishes what the North Carolina courts will consider to be a party's full and
fair opportunity to litigate in a prior action. Last, and most significantly, the
decision implicitly rejects a well-established tradition in North Carolina con-
cerning what constitutes a judgment on the merits.
The judge in McInnis's action against Bobby Hall ruled that the calculation
of interest on a judgment was properly a jury issue. This ruling was the basis for
the judge's refusal to rule at all on how the interest would be calculated. The
tween the defendant parties in the two cases but the identity of issues litigated. This approach is the
Bernhard approach, and its policy implications clearly call for the abandonment of the mutuality
requirement, not merely its circumscription for limited cases.
67. 284 N.C. 348, 200 S.E.2d 799 (1973).
68. Sharpe v. Grindstaff, 329 F.Supp. 405 (M.D.N.C. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Sharpe v. Bradley
Lumber Co., 446 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972).
69. 284 N.C. at 357, 200 S.E.2d at 806.
70. Note, Civil Procedure-Offensive Assertion of a Prior Judgment as Collateral Estoppel-A
Sword in the Hands of the Plaintiff?, 52 N.C.L. REV. 836 (1974).
71. Id. at 848-49.
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supreme court said in Mclnnis, "In fact, the judge in the earlier action erred."'72
Not only is interest properly calculated from the date of a breach, but the issue is
one for the court, not the jury, to determine. The court stated further: "Never-
theless, the fact that a prior judgment was based on an erroneous determination
of law or fact does not as a general rule prevent its use for purposes of collateral
estoppel." 73 McInnis's proper response to the judge's error was to appeal the
judgment, not to bring an action against another party on the same issue.74
McInnis also forecasts how the court will apply the requirement that a
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted has had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate in the prior action. The full opportunity to litigate is the re-
quirement that essentially replaces mutuality,75 so the breadth of the court's
understanding of its meaning is central to the new law developed in this case. At
first glance, the requirement of an opportunity to litigate seems almost meaning-
less if the first McInnis case fulfills it. Since the judge refused not merely to
award the judgment McInnis requested but even to rule on his motion, one won-
ders whether McInnis had any opportunity at all to litigate the issue. On the
other hand, a strict application of the test developed in cases in other jurisdic-
tions would have produced the result at which the McInnis court arrives.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Miller Brew-
ing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.76 read Blonder-Tongue as proposing a five-
part test to determine whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate.77 According to the Miller Brewing test, the court should ask first who
chose the forum in the first case. If the party against whom the estoppel is being
asserted chose the forum, that fact will weigh in favor of a finding that the party
had a full opportunity to litigate.78 In McInnis plaintiff chose the foram in its
action against Bobby Hall. Second, the court should ask whether the party had
incentive to litigate in the first action. If the stakes were trivial in the first ac-
tion, the party might have had little incentive and so may not be required retro-
spectively to have proceeded with greater energy than she reasonably thought
was warranted at the time.79 McInnis had every incentive to litigate the issues
72. 318 N.C. at 431, 349 S.E.2d at 558.
73. Id.
74. This principle is well established in North Carolina law. Karros v. Triantis, 263 N.C. 79,
138 S.E.2d 795 (1964); In re Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied sub nom. Steele v.
North Carolina, 316 U.S. 686 (1942); Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712, 6 S.E.2d 497 (1940);
North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Story, 187 N.C. 184, 121 S.E.2d 433 (1924), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 579,
rev'd on other grounds, 268 U.S. 288 (1925).
75. Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980).
76. 605 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1979).
77. Id. at 992.
78. Id. at 992-93.
79. Id. at 993. In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966), a case involving an offensive assertion of collateral estoppel,
defendant had lost in an earlier action, but the judgment had been comparatively small. Berner, 346
F.2d at 539 (quoting Halmos v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., No. 34123 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 9, 1954)). The court noted that if defendant had sought a new trial, "it had to weigh victory
against a much larger judgment." Id. Given defendant's incentive not to litigate the earlier action




against Bobby Hall in the first case, and the decision gives no indication that
McInnis proceeded with anything less than its full energy to make its case.
Third, the court should ask whether the court in the first case grasped the
technical subject matter. This question does not put in issue whether the court
reached the correct result. The test derives from Blonder-Tongue, a patent case,
and will only present a real issue "when a court is faced with esoteric and com-
plex subject matter beyond its experience and comprehension." 80 Mclnnis
presented no such problem to the court. Fourth, the court should ask whether
the party was deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the prior case. 8 1 Mc-
Innis apparently suffered no such deprivation in its first action.
Last, the Miller Brewing court suggested rather vaguely that the court must
use its "sense of justice and equity" to determine whether the issue was fully
litigated. 82 Did Mclnnis have an opportunity to litigate when the judge essen-
tially refused to listen to its argument? That the supreme court held that McIn-
nis had a full opportunity to litigate in spite of the clear problem with the
equities suggests that the court will impose a fairly mechanical test on this issue,
giving little play to considerations of equity. If this is so, the McInnis result is
comparatively extreme. Whereas the landmark cases emphasized the impor-
tance of the court's sense of the equities, which they could easily do, since the
equities in those cases presented no problems, Mclnnis includes no cautionary
language addressed to the lower courts that will be asked to apply the new law.
The court hardly could be cautionary, as its decision on this issue was not partic-
ularly cautious. The result is that the North Carolina courts have little guidance
on the limits of the new law.
Mclnnis is most significant, however, for its determination of what consti-
tutes a judgment on the merits in a prior action. The majority opinion addressed
this issue in a single sentence, which merely asserted that "the prior suit resulted
in a judgment on the merits." 8 3 In what the court said, it gave no clue as to how
it understood the requirement of a judgment on the merits. But in what it held,
the decision may have overruled a long line of cases defining what constitutes a
judgment on the merits.
When the court ruled that the earlier action had been decided on the merits,
it could not have meant that the action as a whole for contract damages was
decided on the merits. Since the issue in the second McInnis was collateral es-
toppel, the court was not concerned with the earlier case as a whole, but rather
the specific issue in common between the two cases. The ruling must have been
that the issue of prejudgment interest was decided on the merits.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Billings argued that the trial court
made no judgment on the merits in the first action. Her argument concentrated
on the judge's ruling that Mclnnis had waived the issue of prejudgment interest
80. Miller Brewing, 605 F.2d at 993.
81. Id. at 994-95.
82. Id. at 995 (citing Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 334).
83. Mclnnis, 318 N.C. at 429, 349 S.E.2d at 557.
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by failing to request a jury instruction.84 Reviewing the trial judge's findings of
fact, Justice Billings stated:
Neither he nor the jury determined that McInnis was not entitled
under its contract to prejudgment interest; the judge determined that
as against Mr. Hall in the action McInnis had waived its right to re-
cover the interest by not requesting that an issue regarding prejudg-
ment interest be submitted to the jury.... Because the waiver applied
only to the conduct of the action against Mr. Hall, it was not a deter-
mination that McInnis could not recover the interest against other ob-
ligors on the contract.85
Billings cited no North Carolina cases, but quoted from a Hawaii case consider-
ing the precise issue: "'A judgment is not res judicata as to issues raised in a
previous case which were . . . matters which a court expressly refused to
determine.' ",86
Although no North Carolina cases before Mclnnis decided whether an issue
was decided on the merits when the judge declined to make any determination,
many North Carolina cases have defined when a judgment is said to be on the
merits. The leading case, more important for its dicta than for its holding, is
Hayes v. Ricard.8 7 The supreme court declared, "'A judgment on the merits is
said to be one which is based on legal rights as distinguished from mere matters
of practice, procedure, jurisdiction, or form, or is a judgment that determines, on
an issue either of law or fact, which party is right.' "88
The issue in McInnis, then, is whether the judge's refusal to determine Mc-
Innis's right to prejudgment interest was a matter of procedure, or a judgment
determining which party was right. The question answers itself. The judge re-
fused to decide which party was right, that is, whether McInnis had the right to
the interest or whether Bobby Hall had the right to retain that amount. The
judge's determination was entirely a matter of form: McInnis had failed to act
at the proper time, therefore it had forfeited its right to any ruling on his motion.
The principle set out in Hayes and many subsequent cases indicates that the
issue of prejudgment interest in the first action was not decided on the merits.
84. Id. at 439, 349 S.E.2d at 563 (Billings J., concurring) (Justice Meyer joined in this concur-
ring opinion).
85. Id. at 438, 349 S.E.2d at 562 (Billings J., concurring).
86. Id. at 439, 349 S.E.2d at 563 (Billings J., concurring) (quoting Solarana v. Industrial Elec.,
Inc., 50 Haw. 22, 28, 428 P.2d 411, 416 (1967)).
87. 251 N.C. 485, 112 S.E.2d 123 (1960) (holding that a judgment of nonsuit in earlier case, in
which plaintiffs used an opportunity to present evidence, was a judgment on the merits).
88. Id. at 491, 112 S.E.2d at 127 (quoting 30A AM. JUR. Judgments § 348 (1958)). The revised
edition of American Jurisprudence now cites Hayes in support of the proposition that a judgment on
the merits is one that "determines which party is right as to the cause of action in dispute." 46 AM.
JUR. 2D Judgments § 478 (1969); see also Beam v. Almond, 271 N.C. 509, 157 S.E.2d 215 (1967)
(dismissal of prior action for failure to join necessary parties not a judgment on the merits); Moore v.
WOOW, Inc., 250 N.C. 695, 110 S.E.2d 311 (1959) (denial of motion to set aside default judgment
because of failure to allege a meritorious defense is not a judgment on the merits because it is based
on a technical defect and not on the merits); McDevitt v. Chandler, 241 N.C. 677, 86 S.E.2d 438
(1955) (ruling that plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence sufficient to sustain cause of action was
not judgment on the merits); Kirby v. Kirby, 26 N.C. App. 322, 215 S.E.2d 798 (1975) (dismissal of
action for support under Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act for procedural reasons is
not a judgment on the merits).
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For some reason not articulated in the opinion, the Mclnnis court decided
otherwise.
The court's decision may be explained in two ways. The first possibility is
that the court meant to do what it did and that the meaning of a decision on the
merits is changing. If this explanation is correct, the court is setting a very high
value on judicial economy, allowing a plaintiff to be estopped from litigating
under circumstances when prior law would have permitted him to go forward.
Judicial economy would thus be valorized to the detriment of a party's due pro-
cess access to the courts.
The second explanation for the court's apparent undermining of the Hayes
principle is that it intended its ruling to have no effect on the application of that
principle, and that it proceeded as it did because it was eager to take advantage
of an opportunity to abandon mutuality. This explanation does not mean, how-
ever, that the state did not realize the significance of its ruling, because Chief
Justice Billings' criticism brought the issue into sharp focus. Given Justice Bill-
ings' opinion, the majority's disposal of the "merits" question in a single con-
clusory sentence leaves the reader with little more than speculations. Did the
majority believe Billings to be so wrongheaded in her objection that she was
undeserving of a response? Or did the court, in its eagerness to abandon mutual-
ity, refuse to open a question that would so seriously have interfered with its
intention?
These questions open a realm of speculation, but it is relevant to consider
whether the court had any other option open to it, assuming it wanted to find for
Mrs. Hall. Absent another option, it may have opted for overturning the mutu-
ality requirement in order to achieve what it believed to be a just result. If
another option existed, however, then one may assume the court acted with
greater deliberation, abandoning mutuality in this case rather than another be-
cause the facts here were appropriate for establishing the new law of collateral
estoppel in the state.
Justice Billings pointed to such an alternative option when she argued Hall
had a meritorious defense under existing law. She noted the basis of the action
against Hall was the breach of contract, and that Bobby Hall had satisfied a
judgment on that action. Justice Billings continued:
The general rule in this country is that, although res judicata does not
prevent the prosecution of separate actions and the obtaining of sepa-
rate judgments against persons jointly and severally liable on the same
obligation, the satisfaction of a judgment against one such obligor sat-
isfies all debts or judgments based upon the joint and several obliga-
tion, even if the judgments are for different amounts.8 9
Justice Billings concluded that Bobby Hall's satisfaction of the judgment in
the first action constituted "a defense to an action against Mrs. Hall upon the
same obligation." 90 The supreme court had another option if it wanted to find
89. Mclnnis, 318 N.C. at 440, 349 S.E.2d at 563 (Billings J., concurring).
90. Id. (Billings J., concurring). Billings cited no North Carolina cases in support of her argu-
ment, and indeed she had reason to look elsewhere, because when the supreme court considered just
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in favor of Hall.9 1 The court could have introduced an exception to the mutual-
ity requirement allowing an obligor on a joint and several contract to plead a
prior judgment on the contract as collateral estoppel. Although this is not a
generally recognized exception, the Missouri Court of Appeals argued
powerfully for it in a 1908 case, Taylor v. Sartorious.92 The court found that
defendant could not properly plead collateral estoppel, since she was not a party
to the earlier action, and she did not fall into any of the established exceptions. 93
However, the court went on to add an exception for this kind of case. The
court's concern was not so much for this particular defendant as for the defend-
ants who prevailed in the earlier action. If the later case was allowed to go
forward, and if defendant was found liable, she would have been entitled to seek
contribution from the other obligors:
If respondent recovers from appellant, the latter might recover contri-
bution from her co-signers, thereby nullifying the verdict given in their
favor in respondent's suit against them. We are of the opinion that the
statutes making contracts joint and several were not intended to cause
such a result .... It was not the purpose [of the statutes] to give the
promisee as many trials of an issue going to the merits of liability on
the obligation as there are promisors, while denying the latter the bene-
fit of verdicts given for them, unless every possible verdict on the con-
tract is in their favor. 94
The North Carolina Supreme Court might have applied the Taylor limited ex-
this issue shortly after the Civil War, it held that a prior judgment for only part of a claim does not
preclude a subsequent action against another liable party for the remainder. In Hix v. Davis, 68 N.C.
231 (1873), plaintiff sued on a note signed by defendant. Defendant answered that plaintiff had
already sued in South Carolina on the same note, had received a judgment, and it had been satisfied.
Id. at 231. The court noted, however, that it was the custom in South Carolina at the time to awardjudgment for only half the amount of a debt. Id. at 231-32. The court said,
We think his Honor erred in not taking the distinction between the satisfaction of the
judgment and the satisfaction of the debt. Here the judgment was satisfied; but the one half
of the debt excluded by the judgment was not satisfied, and as to that there was no bar to
the plaintiff's right of action ....
Id. at 234. Like Hix, McInnis claimed that the judgment it received against Bobby Hall, and which
Bobby Hall satisfied, was not for the entire amount of the debt. There remained the prejudgment
interest, to which the court agreed McInnis was entitled. McInnis, 318 N.C. at 431, 349 S.E.2d at
558. Because just this amount of the debt remained unsatisfied, McInnis would not be barred from
an action against Hall under the Hix principle. On this analysis, the majority in Mclnnis could not
have taken the alternative course proposed by Billings unless it was prepared to overrule Hix.
91. It is unclear, however, why the court would have any inclination to find for Hall, since it
agreed with McInnis that it was entitled to the interest sought.
92. 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089 (1908). In this case the action was against a joint and
several obligor on a contract, and the plaintiff had already proceeded against the other obligors
unsuccessfully. The trial court had excluded evidence of the earlier proceeding because of the rule
that a plaintiff's action against one joint and several obligor does not bar an action against the other.
Id. at 37-38, 108 S.W. at 1093.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 38-39, 108 S.W. at 1094. The court added that the exception it created could only be
used defensively:
It would not, of course, be contended that a judgment in favor of respondent and against
one of the signers of the power of attorney would be conclusive against the other signers.
The reason is that the other signers would have had no opportunity to present their case;
would not have had their day in court and a chance to examine and cross-examine the
witnesses, or appeal.
Id. at 39, 108 S.W. at 1094.
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ception to McInnis. If, as the McInnis court said, Bobby Hall had already won
on the issue of prejudgment interest, he should not have been subjected to a
possible action for contribution by his wife if she lost.
This theory would have allowed the supreme court to reach the result it did
without using the McInnis case to establish an important change in the law of
collateral estoppel. The availability of a less drastic method of reaching a deci-
sion in favor of Hall may indicate that the court was comfortable with the impli-
cations of the decision on the facts of the case. If so, the law of collateral
estoppel in North Carolina has gone from being relatively restrictive-requiring
mutuality-to being extremely broad in potential application. Even if a prior
action has been decided on narrowly technical grounds, it may serve as the basis
for a collateral estoppel defense. In addition, lower courts are not encouraged to
be cautious in their consideration of the defense when it is asserted by someone
not a party or privy to the earlier action. If the defense satisfies technical re-
quirements, the lower courts will have to allow it unless they adopt their own
cautionary guidelines. 95
The irresistible question is whether the supreme court meant to establish
the North Carolina law of collateral estoppel on the principles McInnis suggests.
If it did intend such an extreme result, one must question the fairness of a princi-
ple that assumes a party received due process rights to adjudication when a
judge refused to rule on the issue. This result not only conflicts with prior North
Carolina law,96 but it conflicts with any reasonable sense of justice as well.
Aside from the implications of the decision for the law of collateral estop-
pel, the decision is puzzling because it exacted a price from the plaintiff when the
court seemed to agree McInnis was right on the merits. The effect of the deci-
sion was to deny McInnis any recourse, since the time limit for filing a notice of
appeal in the action against Bobby Hall had elapsed. 97 This result was not nec-
essary even if the court wanted to abandon the mutuality requirement for collat-
eral estoppel. The ruling on mutuality could have been made only prospectively,
allowing McInnis to continue as it reasonably expected under established princi-
ples of law. Surveying the cases on nonmutual collateral estoppel, Wright,
Miller, and Cooper noted that a "special concern.., arises when preclusion
rests on litigation that occurred before a particular jurisdiction abandoned
mutuality." 98
This concern entered into the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in Grantham v. McGraw-Edison Co.,99 a patent infringe-
ment suit in which defendants argued that a judge's dismissal of an earlier action
involving the same issue entitled them to a nonmutual collateral estoppel defense
95. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
97. N.C. R. APP. P. 3(c).
98. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 3, § 4465. The authors noted, "Most
decisions seem regrettably insensitive to this particular problem," though "[o]ther courts have laud-
ably shown a greater sensitivity." Id.
99. 444 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1971).
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based on Blonder-Tongue. °0 The court held that the judge in the earlier action
had "made a clear error of law" in dismissing the case and that plaintiffs should
not be expected to have foreseen the change in law effected by Blonder-Tongue:
Had the Granthams been aware of the impending partial abrogation of
the mutuality requirement and the possibility that the judgment ad-
verse to them in the earlier litigation might be asserted against them by
other alleged infringers not parties to that action, they would undoubt-
edly have been more diligent in prosecuting their appeal from that
judgment. 10'
Similarly in Mclnnis, if plaintiff had foreseen the change the supreme court
worked on the law in this case, McInnis probably would have appealed the
judge's order in the first case rather than instituting a new action against Hall.
Because the supreme court recognized that McInnis was correct, a proper sensi-
tivity to the situation should have led the court to deny Hall's defense, laying
down the new rule of nonmutual collateral estoppel for future cases only.
The supreme court's eagerness to abandon the mutuality requirement for
defensive collateral estoppel is understandable. When the party against whom
the estoppel is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue and
it has been decided on the merits in one action, that party's rights are not in-
fringed by the estoppel. On the other side, moreover, the defendant is protected
from litigation of issues already decided. Finally, the change in the law is in the
interests of judicial economy. When a principle can serve judicial economy
while at the same time protecting the rights of all parties, the principle is much
to be desired.
It is not clear, however, that the principle of nonmutual collateral estoppel
as established in North Carolina under Mclnnis protects the rights of plaintiffs.
Aside from the particular injustice worked against McInnis in this case, the deci-
sion sets a precedent for the assertion of defensive collateral estoppel when a
party has not had the access to the courts guaranteed by her rights to due pro-
cess. In all likelihood, the supreme court did not intend such an extreme result,
but in bringing all the advantages of nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel to
North Carolina, the court also succeeded in raising questions about fairness and
due process it should have resolved as well.
STUART JOHNSON
100. Id. at 216. For a discussion of Blonder-Tongue, see supra notes 38-51 and accompanying
text.
101. Grantham, 444 F. 2d at 217; see also Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines,
Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965) (attempted offensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel shortly
after law of jurisdiction had changed), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
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